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Introduction 
· In the second essay of 1he Genealogy ef Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche discusses the 
promise and potential that man represents in the world, chronicles the mistakes and 
pitfalls which led to the squandering of this potential for centuries, and lastly, provides 
a possible way out. Contrary (o popular opinions, which cast Nietzsche's philosophy 
as nihilist, thoughtless fascism, or, most disparagingly, the ramblings of a psychotic 
mind, his philosophy was value-driven and hopeful. It is true that Nietzsche saw 
much wrong with the world, with man, and with what has been deemed civilized 
society, but his philosophy is also prescriptive. He does not merely tear down the 
walls, btit offers a blueprint for what could be built with the strength of human hands 
and minds. It is easily forgotten that despite all of the anger and disdain, Nietzsche 
holds a·deep love for man and the unique nature of his existence. 
As such, Nietzsche begins his essay by remarking on tl1at which makes man so 
interesting and exceptional in the world. He finds these remarkable qualities in the 
,., .. 
mental capacities which man possesses ab&~ all other beings. Man is an animal with 
tlie ability to make promises and plan for a future which he must bring about. Man 
has the powers of foresight and will which enables him to push his will through time 
and.space so as to create a future of his choosing. In tandem, man has tlie capacity to 
filter his world, to differentiate between that which is not helpful and necessary, and 
tliat which is accidental; man has the ability to forget what he needs to forget. The 
combination of memory, forgetfulness, and the right to make promises enables man, 
unlike any other.creature, to construct a narrative for his world, to make sense ofit, 
• 
and to write the ending which he finds most suitable. Man alone is supremely aware 
of his impact, possible.and actual, upon the world. 
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It is this awareness which also makes man the only being to entertain the 
notion of responsibility. This awareness is key to understanding the positive nature of 
Nietzsche's philosophy. The mental evolution of humanity created an animal which 
can be sovereign to itself; and this leads to limitless possibility. Truly acknowledging 
this, according to Nietzsche, is the birth of responsibility, which is, in turn, the 
birthplace of the natural; helpful conscience. Unbound by the typical laws of the 
animal kingdom, man's destiny could reach the edge of the possible, if only he would 
be free from himself. 
The great problem concerning man, is that for the longest time, his attempts 
at bettering himself have been misguided and dreadfully harmful. Nietzsche spends a 
great deal of time exploring the rise of man, from the individual to the community, 
from the days of chaos, to tradition, to law, and what he found stands in stark contrast 
to the man which exists today. The past, man's past, far from being 'civilized' is filled 
with blood, cruelty, and force. The story of man is not a narrative of nobility or an 
epic tale of morality slowly conquering the beasts. On the contrary, and quite to 
Nietzsche's point, the progress which prehistoric man made, that which created lofty 
empires and cemented man as the dominant life on the planet, was done through 
violence. Most importantly, for the longest time there was not an inkling of thought 
to suggest that this was wrong. But the tides shift and the sea changes, and at some 
point, man strove to change his character and eject all of those natural instincts which 
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made him so successful in the first place. Thus, according to Nietzsche, began the fall 
of man. 
Necessitated by the-destruction of man's instincts and rejection of his nature, 
man was forced to create new ideals, values and, ultimately, gods. Without their 
. instincts to guide them, these creations became guideposts for man's behavior. The 
innocence of man would never return to the way it was once man forsook his nature 
for these artificial constructs. These constructs, Nietzsche says, were, and are, 
fundamentally at odds with man's nature, and so, over the long run, have been 
extremely detrimental to man's existence in the world. The hypocrisy of man's 
attempts to shed his nature is epitomized by his obsessions with justice and 
punishment, and, as such, Nietzsche devotes a lot of his thought to these two distinctly 
human phenomena. 
Justice, although it is held as one of the highest and noblest ideals, has, 
according to Nietzsche as· brutal and blciody a past as any of man's instincts which this 
false nobility deemed unworthy. The same can be said for punishment. The 
common misconception is that punishment exists in tandem with justice, as the 
enforcing power of the ideal, but that, Nietzsche claims, is a dire misunderstanding of 
the thing and of human nature. Punishment, far from being an offshoot and 
necessary result of this thing called justice, was conceived entirely separately and only 
recently has been shoehorned into this niche. Discovering what really lay behind 
these ever-present ideas and activities reveals basic truths about human nature and 
how man was meant to live, before he began to feel shame at his being. 
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This rejection of man's being, this construction of ideals, which man often 
claims as strength; Nietzsche posits as being the result of weakness, and the unfortunate 
triumph of the gathered weak against the strong. At that moment, man's true nature 
·was forsaken and the man's fall was cemented by the creation of the bad conscience. 
Nietzsche's account of the bad conscience highlights the truth behind what many 
claim to be the civilizing of man, but Nietzsche identifies as the taming of man; and 
this truth, what civilized man was born of, what created 'civility' was far from it, and it's 
motives· far darker than many would like to admit. And this bad conscience, man's 
distrust and disgust with his. nature, was then bolstered and assisted by the creation of 
divinities; a combination which Nietzsche says almost destroyed man beyond 
redemption. 
Having already rejected his own nature and being, his instincts and his 
physicality, the emergence of a god, of something that would substantiate and justify 
this disgust, only furthered man's self-destructive tendencies. In God, men of the bad 
conscience found something which could magnify their unworthiness and give them 
something to worship in their place. God became the driving force behind man's own 
imperfection, and eventually, with dire consequences, its savior. The emergence of 
the judeo-christian God and the arrival of the bad conscience, together, locked 
mankind into generations of service to their own destruction, as man's sense of worth 
plummeted to the depths and their creations, such as justice and God, perched loftily 
on their pedestals. 
But Nietzsche had more in mind than simply raging against the world and 
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heralding doom from the mountaintops, as he does not believe that man is beyond 
saving. Despite the polemical tone and clear disgust evident in his discussion of 
modem society, Nietzsche has a deep-seated faith in the power ofman. He is not 
diametrically opposed .to the notions of society, values, or even God; he is only 
opposed when he sees these things hindering man's progress through the world. All 
of these could serve to realize the highest potential of mankind, but instead Nietzsche 
sees them used to deride humanity·and shackle it to the whims of the weak. His final 
thoughts on the matter are not an epitaph for humanity, but a plea for man to come 
back from the brink,. to be a little more Greek, a little more Zarathustra, and impose 
their will on the world instead of bowing down before the will of the weak or the past. 
Man, to Nietzsche is the most amazing thing on this Earth, unique, powerful,.free; his 
goal is to awaken the rest of the world to its own possibility. 
Section 1 
"To breed an animal with the right to mak£ promises - is not this the paradoxical task that 
nature has set itself in the case of man? Is it not the real problem regarding man?" 
Thus Nietzsche begins his second essay in the Genealogy of Morals. He 
identifies the right to make promises as the problem and paradoxical task of man. 
The problem is not avarice, lust, or wrath, as many moral leaders of the centuries 
would have mankind believe. It is not the inherent biological infirmity of our 
. · corporeal existence belittling our rational side, as past dualists would affirm. The 
· . problem lies in promises, not the ability to make them, but the right to make them . 
..f 
Proririses appear as words and thus can be made by any speaking individual, but, for 
Nietzsche, a real promise is a rare thing and one with the right to make promises is 
even rarer. 
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Interestingly, before further defining what a promise is and what is necessary 
for an agent legitimately to make a .promise, Nietzsche halts to address that force 
which he identifies as the antithesis. to memory, the opposition - without Goliath there 
would be no David, and without a counteractive force, a promise would mean little. 
This countering force is forgetfulness ~ whose modern conception is weak and passive,· 
a mistake in Nietzsche's eyes. Forgetfulness is an active faculty, a "positive faculty of 
repressiont with a necessary, though unappreciated, function. 
Forgetfulness is seen these days as a lazy negative. When something is 
forgotten, it is seen not as a victory.for the tool of forgetting, which un-clutters the 
mind and shuns those things deemed unimportant to the current function; rather it is 
seen as ·a failure of memory. The cause is seen as a lack of action from the memory, 
instead of a complete action from forgetfulness. To Nietzsche, the ability to forget is 
of utmost importance, because it frees the individual from becoming a completely 
reactionary force in the world. 
"Forgetting is no mere vis inertwe as the superficial imagine; it is rather an 
active and in the strictest sense positive faculty of repression, that is responsible for the 
fact that what we experience and absorb enters our consciousness as little while we are 
digesting it." Nietzsche's point is that the human mind 'forgets'. things all the time. 
At every waking instant, the mind is filtered. In order to aim the mind, concentrate 
on a particular duty or project., or-merely enjoy the sunshine, consciousness needs to 
. be free from.the constant sensory bombardment that results from living in the world. 
The events of yesterday need to make room for today, and the thoughts of tomorrow 
will need space from the musings of.today. Sometimes they need to be thrown out 
completely, and sometimes input simply needs to sit on the back,burner while more 
pressing issues are attended to. Forgetfulness allows this to happen - it allows the 
mind to move cin from the inflammatory, the bizarre, or an inundation of the banal. 
Nietzsche highlights the usefulness of this function with a physio-biological analogy. 
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The freedom that forgetfulness gives to the mind, freedom from complete 
conscious analysis .and inspection of every piece of sensory input, is akin to the 
freedom that t,he body affords one during nourishment, physical input. The mind is 
not bothered, troubled; or hijacked by the digestive process. A million chemical 
reactions and muscle contractions accompany the act of eating and digesting, but no 
mind is paid to them. If it were nece·ssary to devote one's mind to digestion, the time 
wasted would be monumental. In much the same way, if humans did not possess the 
abilityto forget, a proactive yet innate force, our lives would be devoted to calculating 
minutiae of everyday sensory input and little would be left to devote to the higher, 
nobler causes and thoughts. "For our organism is an oligarchy." 
· · Nietzsche's division of man's drives is seemingly derived from Plato. Man is 
an oligarchy,. with reason at the head. Reason fights to control the lesser drives, 
appetites and their ilk, as much as possible. Forgetfulness allows the mind, reason, to 
dismiss the small and unimportant, and focus on the important. And, as with Plato, 
this hierarchy is not only.necessary.for the sake of noble achievement and progress, 
but also for living well in the world - the key difference being, for Nietzsche, this does 
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· not require the same· rigorous virtue described by Plato. Forgetfulness acts to preserve 
this oligarchical structure "like a doorkeeper, a preserver of psychic order" and 
without it "there could be no happiness, no cheerfulness, no hope, no pride, no 
present." 
Thus we see perhaps the most important function of forgetfulness. Not only 
does it allow for the mind to devote itself to higher functions, but it allows us to be . .If 
one forgot nothing, one could never be done with anything. Forgetfulness allows man 
to move beyond the past. It allows him to forget the wrongs done to him and the . 
wrongs personally. committed, it allows the human creature to move past the mistakes 
and enjoy the present - without forgetfulness, each man would be chained to the 
immovable weight of the past. Referring to his earlier analogy, Nietzsche says.that 
the man who cannot forget is even more crippled than the dyspeptic man - "he 
cannot 'have done' with anything." Thus forgetfulness emerges as neither inactive, 
nor accidental, nor detrimental to the human life:· On the contrary, it exists as an 
enabling force, without which one could not live a full human life, one conducive to 
accomplishment or even the enjoyment of happiness. 
Such is created the paradox of man, in Nietzsche's eyes. It is a creature whose 
intellect and emotion demands the ability to forget - without forgetting there could be 
no progress or prosperity - and simultaneously a creature which strives to enforce its 
will on the world around it - a creature built for it - and such enforcement demands 
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continuity, and as such memory. The drive to enforce one's will upon the world, the 
ability to demand this.and achieve it, rests on the ability opposed to forgetfulness - the 
memory. It is this.memory which allows for human beings to be the only animal 
capable-of crafting a promise.· It is important to remember, however, that the real 
paradox emerges nqt in the abilities afforded to man, but in his quest to earn the ri{jzt 
to make promises. Middling.speech and memory offer even the meanest fool the 
ability to promise, but few have the right. 
"[A promise] involves no mere passive inability to rid oneself of an impression, 
no mere indigestion through a once-pledged word with which one cannot 'have 
done,' but an active desire not to rid oneself, a desire for the continuance of something 
. desired once; a real memory qf the will.". The act of promising entails far more drive and 
will than most are likely to admit. In a world of understanding, it is not unheard of, 
or looked poorly upon, to break one's promise in the face of 'mitigating' or 'unseen' 
circumstances. The rise.and fall of chance is often seen as a suitable excuse for the 
collapse of a modem,day promise. Nietzsche abhors this, shuns it, and casts it out as 
false. These promises, allowed to be broken by the guileless hands of fate, are false 
promises, to Nietzsche, and those that utter them do not bear the right to give them. 
And if these people were strong enough to attain that right, they would not watch 
them crumble with a light heart. 
A promise is a statement of will. Making a promise is an active choice 
reflecting the desire of the individual at a certain point in time and it stakes the claim 
that the will of the promise-giver will extend, forcefully, through time and space to 
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, enact the present desire in,the future. A promise is a statement of desire, a statement 
of intent, and a challenge, pitting one's will against the forces of the world, human 
and not, and prematurely declaring the self the victor. A promise is strength. Only 
those strong enough to rein ·in the world and themselves are qualified to give such a 
promise. Only the strong can stand.at-the head of a flowing river and divert the flow 
up the mountain. 
"To ordain the future in advance in this way, man must first have learned to 
distinguish necessary events from chance ones, to think causally, to see and anticipate 
distant eventualities as if they belonged to the present, to decide with certainty what is 
the goal and what the means to it, and in general be able to calculate and compute." 
The right to make promises, therefore, is not merely a matter of strength. ·it is not 
merely a work of force. To make a promise, the agent must have a thorough 
understanding and grasp cif. the complex series of actions and reactions which exist in 
their world. An individual making a promise must have an understanding of these 
things because a promise extends temporally. One cannot honestly and sincerely 
promise anything, big or small, if one does not understand and appreciate the 
difficulties ahead. A promise is a plan; and to make a plan one needs reliable 
information as well as the ability to utilize it. Understanding the nature of cause and 
effect, with regards to the inanimate and the animate, and discerning the salient details 
in a given situation are as integral to the promise as the will to see it through. There is 
no such thing as 'mitigating circumstances,' there is only a promise kept and a 
promise broken. 
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But how can one play- this game, making promises, when the pieces in play are 
human? Predicting human behavior is not a scientific endeavor, but a dodgy art at 
best. Man is simultaneously ya':'m-inducing and wildly erratic .. But for the agent who 
imagines himself strong enough, a promise demands an understanding of human 
nature, or at least the will to overcome it. By making a promise, the agent takes the 
actions of free-trunking others· upon his shoulders and claims that these actions will 
not interfere or will be beaten. But that is not the fundamental understanding which· 
1s necessary. "Man himself must first of all have become calculable, regular, necessary, 
even in his own image of himself, if he is to be able to stand security for his own 
future, which is what one who promises does!" The first battle to be won, in the war 
Tor .the human oath, is to understand onesel[ Before one can swear to future events, 
outcomes, and wishes involving others and the outside world, one, must first overcome 
oneself. One must first understand one's own appetites, motivations, and emotions, 
reign these in, and become master of the self, before one can claim to master the 
uruverse. 
Section 2 
"Trns precisely is the long story of how responsibili!)i originated." 
As mentioned above, the necessary step towards an individual capable and 
worthy of promises is a calculable humanity. In order for one agent among many to 
declare the future, the agents making the future must be understood. And to be a 
predictable animal, man must be an animal of routine and custom; he must become 
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an animal of moraliry. · This process; by which man becomes predictable and promises 
are made possible, Nietzsche calls the "morality of mores." This morality was formed 
and inculcated through centuries of social labor, a "prehistoric" labor, to Nietzsche. 
And while Nietzsche does not value its methods, or even the goals it may have laid out 
for itself, he does value the endgame. Though created through "severity, tyranny, 
stupidity, and idiocy," the result of these years of behavioral conditioning was that 
man became an animal which· could be predicted and calculated. This, being' 
. fundamental to the right to-make. promises, made the shackles of prehistoric morality 
worth it. 
It is only centuries later, at the end of this transformation, that anything 
· · worthwhile is born. The morality of mores and the customs beaten into the populace 
made man calculable, yes, but that alone.is worth less than nothing. This neutering of 
the human· animal would not be worth the transformation if not for the fact that it 
. allows the ascension of the inan with the right and ability to make promises. At the 
end of this age-old labor, "we discover that the ripest fruit is the sovereign indi.vidual, like 
only to himself, liberated again from the morality of custom, autonomous and 
supramoral (for "autonomous" and "moral" are mutually exclusive), in short, the mart 
_. who has his own independent, protracted will and the right to make promises." 
The prehistoric labor, the construction of custom and morality; though they 
were born with their own agendas, their worth is ultimately measured by the role they 
play in the rise of the sovereign individual. The sovereign individual is a power unto 
himself, an unburdened agent whose force of will is sufficient to lift the agent from the 
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middling masses of drones living. through rote custom and morality. He is like only to 
· himself - he has-risen above that which made man calculable, and instead acts upon a 
calculable mankind. Thennorality which fashioned mankind into something usable is 
of no more use to .. the sovereign individual. As Nietzsche noted, autonomous and 
moral are mutually exclusive. One eanrtot be master of oneself and follow the rules of 
others: This sovereign individual is a conqueror of himself and the other. He 
understands and utilizes the calculable nature of mankind, but is not a slave to it. He 
· is the-strength of mah at its most· free, and he alone reserves the right to make 
prormses. 
It is only right that this individual would feel the weight of such a newfound 
ability, an-earned right. Let there be no mistake - the right to make promises is earned. 
It is not· given; but taken by" those strong enough to see it and wield it. This is 
:accompanied, no doubt, by a cognizance of the accomplishment. The sovereign 
· .individual knows what it has overcome and willed itself past; morality and custom are 
trifles when compared to the power and freedom of the sovereign. This agent 
rightfully stands above therest of mankind, proudly aware of his superiority over 
those whose wills are not so free or strong, those who have not earned the right to 
make promises; a right which "necessarily gives him mastery over circumstances, over 
nature, and over all more short-willed and unreliable creatures." Thus, the sovereign 
individual represents man-at its freest and most powerful, deserving of trust, fear, and 
reverence all at'once; the rest fall.in the other half of Nietzsche's dichotomy, as "short-
willed and unreliable creatures." 
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!tis impossible, and unreasonable to ask, that the sovereign individual would 
be unaware of such a dichotomy. Being completely free and at the mercy of only 
oneself, the sovereign individual constructs his owri value system. Not'bowing to any 
previous conception, the.sovereign individual values the strength he sees in the world 
and condemns the weak-willed. Sovereigns necessarily honor other sovereigns, others 
maximizing their human potential in the world, just as he honors himself. He 
respects those who seem to recognize the weight of human ability and possibility as he 
does, those who have earned the right to make promises by doing so sparingly and 
fulfilling them once they are made. And rightfully so, the sovereign individual 
-harbors disdain for the weak, especially the weak who pretend to be strong. Those 
who make promises with no intention of keeping them, or who make them and lack 
the strength to see them through. Once the right to make promises has been earned, 
the sovereign appreciates the weight of power and responsibility, and cannot help but 
bear ill-will for those that do not appreciate it. 
"The proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of responsibiliry, the 
consciousness of this rare freedom, this power over oneself and fate, has in his case 
penetrated to the profoundest depths and become instinct, the dominating instinct." 
One cannot attain the level of power and will necessary to earn·the right to make 
promises without comprehending what it is that one is doing- laying one's will upon 
the world and making it so, In this way, a promise is a statement of dominance. A 
promise is a declaration· of the supremacy of the individual will over time, space, and 
the wills of others. The weight of such power makes a permanent impression upon 
15 
the soul of the sovereign, and this newfound responsibility becomes an integral part of 
his existence, forever coming to bear on his actions. "What will he call this 
dominating instinct, supposing he feels the need to give it a name? The answer is 
beyond doubt: this sovereign man calls it his conscience." 
Section3 
. "His conscience? - It is easy to guess that the concept of 'conscience' that we 
here encounter in its highest, almost. astonishing, manifestation, has a long history and 
variety of forms behind it. To possess the right to stand security for oneself and to do 
so· with pride, thus to possess also the right to effirm oneself- this, as has been said, is a 
ripe fruit, but also a late fruit: how long must this fruit have hung on the·tree, unripe 
and sour! And for a much longer time nothing whatever was to be seen of any such 
fruit: no one could have promised its appearance, although everything in the tree was 
preparing for and growing toward it!" 
The journey towards the creation of the sovereign man has been a long and 
arduous one. To create something so powerful, so unique in the natural world, has 
taken centuries of evolution; although these efforts have not always known what 
exactly it was that they were forging. 
The earliest efforts manifested themselves as crude, rudimentary attempts at 
creating a memory for the human animal - mnemotechnics. Mnemotechnics operated 
from the basic assumption that the surest way towards achieving permanence in the 
, thought or behavior of the individual was through pain. This has been the oldest, and 
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saddest, according to Nietzsche, dogmatic truth in the study-of human psychology. 
The powerful, prehistoric remnants.of these lessons, struck into the human psyche 
through generations of oaths ·made, and broken, in blood, are the ghosts, Nietzsche 
says, that attend the mind of.man whenever he feels the need to be 'serious.' Whether 
it be through sacrifice, penance, ·or absolution, the creation of a memory has been a 
bloody affair for mankind since he first learnt its value, and the power of pain. 
This, according to Nietzsche, is the basis and strength of all of asceticism. "A 
few ideas are to be rendered inextinguishable, ever-present, ·unforgettable, 'fixed,' 
with the aim of hypnotizing the entire nervous and intellectual system." The 
mnemotechnic machinations are designed towards 'freeing' these desired ideas from 
the cacophony oflesser drives,- but in the eyes of a man such as Nietzsche, who draws 
the borders of autonomy around morality, such coercive measures reflect a dire 
mistake with regards to the progression-of the human animal. The mind ofa man is 
not a piece of metal, to be hammered and forced into position - a mindless man, 
following the rules of the vicious, is ri.o better than a beast. Although the mind of the 
man needs to be lifted, and Nietzsche would not be one to shy from a harsh 
education, the destruction of the mind's autonomy renders the entire operation 
empty. This is the downfall of asceticism; that men would exchange their power and 
responsibility in the world for the false promise of certitude, and a pain that assures 
them. 
To return to the·more basic creation of a human memory, that which 
enabled men to joi~ together in productive society, a q1:1ick study of the nature of a 
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society's system of punishment, delivered in exchange for 'forg_etting' that which one 
has 'promised' not to. do in-society, is telling as to the nature of.man's bloody conquest 
over In ms elf and his: less polite urgings. With his own people as an example, 
. Nietzsche reminds us of how much it has taken in order. to carve man into a socially 
acceptable creature. German modes of punishment have been cruel, with such means 
as stoning, quartering, and flaying alive,. but not particularly unique; but they serve as 
a testament to the bloody- lnstory lnding behind the more noble aspects of modem 
society. 
"With the aid ofsui:h images ana procedures one finally remembers five or six 
'I will not's,' in regard to winch one had given one's promise so as to participate in the 
advantages of society- and it was indeed with the aid of this kind of memory that one 
at last came 'to reason'!" Indeed, Nietzsche's scorn is evident, that such a mind would 
be said to be a 'reasoning' one or that ·such an agreement would be called a 'promise'; 
. one must question ·if such an· individual even has the capacity to promise in the 
Nietzschean· sense. BU:t it is exactly this lack of thought, and surrender to pain and 
uncertainty, that undergirds the serious world of the modem man and his customs. 
This memory, which had been created with the aim to free the thinking man, must 
next free itself from its creator. Now having a memory, the human animal needs to 
free itself to choose that winch it will remember. 
Section 4 
"But how did that other 'somber thing,' the consciousness of guilt, the 'bad 
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conscience,' come into the world?" 
Nietzsche again decries ,the work of those that have come before him, those 
genealogists of morals whose conclusions he asserts "stay at a more than respectful 
distance from the truth." This is precisely because the genealogists before him had no 
appreciation for the study of·history. They had no inkling that the answers they 
sought were to be found not within the increasingly convoluted and meaningless 
sphere of modern disconnected theoretical psychology, but within the bloody annals 
. of history. It is pure folly fo attempt to understand the innermost workings of the 
human animal while dismissing the centuries of tempering and tampering that have 
created him. That which man does now is an echo of the meaning of the past, an 
evolution, hopefully but not surely; something different, but with a rich history. 
· Taken in a smaller timeline, just as to understand a man's actions at his death, one 
must understand what he has lived. To ignore the history of human morality while 
attempting to. decipher.it, is to ignore the greatest tool available. It is only fitting that. 
the fruits of such a labor would be worthless and grand insights missed. "Have these 
genealogists of morals had even the remotest suspicion that, for example, the major 
moral _concept Schuld [guilt] has its origin in the very material concept Schulden 
[debts]? Or that punishment, as requital, evolved quite independently of any 
presupposition concerning freedom or non-freedom of the will." . 
And.what revelations these are! That the noble notion of guilt, the mark of 
the pious, would have in its lineage something as cold and corporeal as a debt! But 
even more so, that the birth of punishment is something quite separate from 
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deserving .. The dispensation of punishment, now seen as the realm of-the just, had, at 
· t . its core, according to Nietzsche, not-a thing to do with justice . .Ideas of intentionality 
and0 cause were· late to the mind of the human animal, but pain and punishment were 
:• always there. To the modern mind, it is nigh instinctive to assess the.questions of 
· cause, intention, and accident when supposing guilt or innocence, but the idea that 
criminals are punished because. they"''could have.acted differently," is the result ofan 
.ev9lving human-concept ofjustice;not-the beginning. To suppose otherwise is to take 
• a·dishonest.view of humanity, and the conclusions so garnered will be as upside-down 
as their foundation. 
: ·· The brutal fact of the past is that punishment did not begin as a measure of 
justice, dispensing requital pain, but as a crude expression of anger and spirit. 
. Punishment was the human animal discharging its power to cause pain towards that 
.which brought it pain. Importantly, it was not an expression of justice, enacted 
because of the deed ,which was done;·i:mly an unleashing of animalistic rage towards 
an event or individual seen to be the cause. There was no moral aspect, only pain for 
pain. "But this anger is held in check and modified by the idea that every injury has 
its equivaknt and can actually be paid back, even if only through the pain of the 
culprit." 
Therein lies an important question. Where did this idea come from? 
· Exchanging pain for pain is as old as violence itself, but wherefore did this new idea 
gain root in the human mind?" What was it that could stay the anger and bloodlust of 
· .the human animal, the most powerful animal? Something happened, something was 
__ .. ,, 
,.·. ••' 
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there that stayed the-han'd of the po"'.erful as the powerless lay under his paw. Says 
. Nietzsche, "I have already divulged it: in the contractual relationship between creditor 
and debtor." -Thus the journey returns to the material impulse of man - the heart of 
justice, guilt, and mercy. 
Section 5 
· "When we contemplate these contractual relationships, to be sure, we feel 
considerable suspicion and repugnance toward those men of the past who created or 
permitted them. This was to be expected from what we have previously noted." 
That the birth of something as sacred as a promise would be such a bloody 
an\f cruel affair is an affront to the modern cwility of the human creature and the . 
nobility of what he has created. Men of high society revel simultaneously in their 
status as men 'of their word' and as gent/£ men, polite members of society. What they 
· do not know is that the· civil mask they now wear was designed and fashioned by the 
most brutal and 'base' of man's instincts. 
But what else could be done? The creation of promises, as meaningful 
expressions, required the creation of a memory. This creation, in tum, required man 
to affix these orders by that way which he knew best - cruelty and pain. To compel 
man the animal to respect the power of words, his fellow man tied his words to his 
body .. Just as the creditors of old ordered, to establish the promise as something 
sacred and in order to "impress repayment as a duty," any failure on the debtor's part 
could be taken from his flesh or his belongings. His life, his family, and his wealth 
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were all acceptable penalties for failure to repay. In fact, in olden days the legal code 
· reflected.this mentality; and laid down detailed instructions as to what could be done · 
to the debtor, i.e. the flesh to gold ratio. 
This was common practice in the older, harsher days; days when man was just 
learning to promise. The failure to repay, the breaking of a promise, opened the 
debtor_ to almost any and all forms of sadistic cruelty, with two-fold design. 
Importantly, the flaying of the debtor did not serve only to impress the severity of 
promises made·and broken upon'the debtor, but also. to assuage the feelings of 
iajustice that had undoubtedly arisen within the spumed creditor. The pain and 
cruelty brought to bear upon the untrustworthy debtor not only hurts the debtor, but 
brings pleasure to the creditor. 
At the end of this bloody and unfortunate exchange, what has come forth? 
Man does not bleed ·gold and cu·tting the debtor does not restore the creditor's coffers, 
so where is the compensation? The debtor has learned his lesson and his marks will 
not let him forget it, but the creditor, not to be forgotten, find his compensation in 
harming the debtor - "a re'compense in the form of a kind of pleasure - the pleasure of 
being allowed to vent his power freely upon one who is powerless." This has no 
material worth, but an emotional worth on par with the purest gold. This eajoyment 
is only intensified by the more egregious the debtor's crime and the lower his station. 
The creditor-vents his rage and enjoys a taste of"the right of the masters" - that is, he 
revels in the joy of being above someone, and hurting them carelessly. Later, the 
power of punishment would fall more securely within the hands of the authorities, but 
the same dri\/c remained, it'simply became voyeuristic. In an instance ofnon-
payment;recompense "consists in a warrant for and title to cruelty!' 
Section 6 
"If was in. this sphere then, .the sphere oflegal obligations, that the moral 
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· conceptual world of 'guilt,' 'conscience,' 'duty,' 'sacredness of duty' had its origin; its 
beginnings were; like the beginning of everything great on earth, soaked in blood 
thoroughly and for a long time." 
That these aspects of human moral society, commonly viewed as high or 
noble, have their roots in such bloody and savage soil is surely something to be 
· .. weighed heavily., That the ·ideals which humans strive for, and the impetus within, 
come from the malice and bloodlust of men, as opposed to the divine or some 
supernatural sense of moral truth,"brings such things closer to earth. It opens them to 
· reinterpretation and reevaluation .. To understand modem man, one must understand 
how far these roots go. 
According to Nietzsche, this bloody trail has woven its way all through history, 
changing perhaps its name, but not its nature. Even the steadfast Christian 
philosopher, Immanuel Kant,.famed for his strong sense of duty and conscience even 
at the expense of the sovereign agent, could not escape the history of his ki1,1d. 
Nietzsche describes the categorical imperative as cruel, and how could he not? It 
demands the individual to subvert himself, sacrifice himself, in the name of duty. In 
the name of ancient pacts and promises, Kant demands modem man submit himself 
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to the rules and punishments of old, This is largely due to the· fact that.Kant was a 
wholehearted believer in the c9nnection between guilt and suffering; more precisely, 
the notion that suffering is the proper response to guilt. 
As this connection has grown, from its beginnings as punishment from 
creditor to debtor, the question :must be asked again, "To what extent can suffering 
balance debts or guilt?" What is the connection between the two, that leads 
even(especially) the most pious to believe that suffering, penance, can counteract the 
guilt of'sins' past? This notion, born and bred in early cruelty, not only survived, but 
thrived, even in the minds of the holy and high; surely something had changed. Surely 
the connection had evolved or distilled into something 'higher,' befitting those that 
·embraced it. Nietzsche's response is simultaneously dark and illuminating, "To what 
extent can suffering-balance debts or guilt? To the extent that to make suffer was in 
the highest degree pleasurable." 
Though it bt, cloaked iri everything from justice to divinity,.the base logic of 
these interactions remains'the human ·.delight in causing suffering .. In either arithmetic, 
monetary for the creditor or spiritual for the priest, suffering serves to balance the 
books only inasmuch as the wronged individual derives pleasure from the suffering of 
others. In modem Western society, this is typically viewed as bloodthirsty and 
despicable behavior. One has only to look to The Merchant q[Venice, a Western 
masterpiece from a Western hero, and the character Shylock. Shylock is honestly 
owed a great sum, but due to his bloody desire to amend this debt, he is the villain. 
Driven by his desire to hurt those in his debt, he is publicly scorned and ruined. 
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Nietzsche's point·is·that God's divine justice and the penance he-demands are no 
.different; they are merely dressed up; dishonest, cultivated expressions of man's bloody 
justice. But no one wants to see that. 
"It seems to me that the delicacy and even more the tartuffery of tame 
.domestic animals (which.is to say modem men, which is to say us) resists a really vivid 
comprehension of the degree to which cmelry constituted the great festival pleasure of 
more primitive men_and was indeed an ingredient of almos_t every one of their 
pleasures." To Nietzsche; modem man has turned its back.on what it could, ·shouM, 
be in exchange for a prettier, more 'sophisticated,' image of man the animal - man 
the servant of morality. This startling sea change Nietzsche derides as tartuffery, 
· meaning hypocrisy butalso a nod to Molier's play Tarteffe and it is worth noting the 
character of Tartuffe was a hypocritical, fraudulent man of God who used-his cunning 
to ensnare the less adept, because at these crucial points in history man began to hate 
· himself. Man began to reviltl and scorri that which was existed at the center of man's 
being, that which drove man the animal-to supremacy, the happy ability to discharge 
one's power without guilt or remorse. That this manifested itself in violent, forceful 
ways is only natural, according to Nietzsche, and no more morally repugnant than a 
hawk devouring a mouse. 
But what began "innocently," "naively," as simply an instinct of man, soon fell 
to "spiritualization and deification.": The right to violence, the right to expend such 
energies, fell to those in high· society, as a societal right, just as it was condemned by 
la,wfor t!J,e rest. Indeed, it was not exceedingly long ago that those with the most 
.. 
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power could still very much get· away with violent expressions offestivity. As 
Nietzsche notes, weddings, festivals, and other celebratory occasions were often 
accompanied by brutal displays such as executions or other punishments. Even then, 
as the human instinct for violence _was being deformed, celebrating life, saying yes to 
the experience, went hand in hand with the cruelties oflife. And in the darkened 
halls of the homes of those wealthy enough, the old forms of cruelty manifested 
themselves as ·''.no noble· household was without creatures upon whom· one could 
heedlessly vent one's malice and cruel jokes." Thus the hypocrisy presents itself- the 
high, the noble, deride man's natural instincts all the while nurturing and indulging 
, . them under the guise of secrecy or civilized justice . 
. .. To further: illuminate .this distortion and tartulfery of which he speaks, 
.Nietzsche's next example is Don Qjlixote, Cervantes' masterpiece of.the early I 7th 
century (released mere years after 7he A1erchant ef Venice). He warns that modern 
audierices and their sens_ibilities would be offended by the abuse and general 
. mistreatment the protagonist suffers at the hands of the Duchess, but impresses that 
audiences of Cervantes' time would have had no qualms with such behavior. In fact, 
it would seem only natural that a member of such a class as the Duchess would have 
the right to handle their subordinates as roughly as they deemed pleasurable. Indeed, 
the torment which Quixote suffers in the court of the Duchess was comedic gold in its 
time. The bloody drive ~f Shylock, though legal and fair, was roundly derided as 
barbaric, yet the.same instinct for violence, although in a different, more advanced 
form, was celebrated when it came from the Duchess. Because, according to 
26 
Nietzsche, regardless of how man and his society may twist it, .hide it, or revile it, "To 
see,others suffer does bne good, to make others suffer even more: this is a hard saying 
but an ancient, mighty, human,. all-too-human principle to which even the apes might 
subscribe." ·.Cruelty is an entrenched aspect of humanity, a permanent part of the 
human .condition, as involved in and necessary to the enjoyment oflife as any other 
part. To.dismiss it, to outlaw it, is a crime against man's own nature. 
Section 7 
"Let me declare expressly that·in the days when mankind was not yet ashamed 
of its cruelty, life on earth was more cheerful than it is now that pessimists exist." 
These pessimists of whom Nietzsche speaks are those who would condemn a 
natural part of man's being,.his desire for.violence and the expression of force, tum 
their backs on it, and then bemoan the world that contains it. These pessimists see . 
the ·world as dark and depressed,' but on!J because thry color it that wqy themselves. These· 
men feel shame at what they are, and thus certainly are prone to angst, depression, 
and rejection oflife. Saying 'No' to what they are and thus saying 'No' to life, these 
men, who seek to trans.form man from an animal into something supposedly divine, 
have ·done no more good for humanity then weeds which choke out the life of those 
around them.· Tlie weed will grow, but nothing else. In rejecting the true nature of 
man, in becoming "ashamed of'all his instincts," man has created an image for 
himself not.in accordance with his abilities. All of this progressed to the point at 
which man could barely stomach himself, as evidenced by Pope Innocent the Third's 
...... 
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· catalogued condemnation oftli.e human condition. Man was left with nothing except 
the stark difference between his reality, and the ought he could never attain. 
One of the symptoms of this existential sickness is a fundamental 
misunderstanding. regarding the nature of the world, more accurately the role of pain 
and violence in said world. After rejecting the more primal, violent yet perfectly 
natural, instincts of man the animal, man was left living in a world surrounded, and 
molded, by such instincts, also natural, yet alien to the new conception. Such is the 
case with modem iman, that they mourn the existence of suffering in the world and 
view it as the singular fantastic flaw in the otherwise spectacular phenomenon that is 
life on Earth. This flaw is so. great as to topple ideas as grandiose as the gods, spawn a 
reactionary discipline in opposition ,-- theodicy, and even arouse doubt as to the value of 
existence itself. But this adverse reaction to the nature of the world, the suffering 
· inherent to·living, is not necessary to the human condition; it is man's forgetting of his 
natural, .powerful self, and a time when "men were unwilling to refrain from making 
suffer and saw in it an enchantment of the first order, a genuine seduction to life," that 
leaves man miserable and out of place. 
But the only thing that could make this suffering more unpalatable to the 
modem sensitive man was the senselessness of it. Suffering seemingly at random is an 
insult to the newly dignified conception of man and his mission. This is at the heart of 
spiritual creation, whether it 'be the Christian or any other mythology; a desire to 
make sense of the suffering in the world. Earlier conceptions made sense of suffering 
by creating a supernatural spectator, a cosmic watcher who dealt suffering for 
pleasure or justice. The stories and.motivations would differ; but the end result was 
the same.-: seffering had a reason. "So as to abolish hidden, undetected , unwitnessed 
suffering from the world and honestly to deny it, one was in the past virtually 
compelled to invent gods and genii of .all the heights and depths, in .short something 
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,.that roams even in. secret. .. and will not easily let an interesting painful spectacle p.ass 
·unnoticed." The Christian mythology later arrived at the idea that this observation 
would bring salvation to· the observed; a softer touch to a primeval attempt at 
comfort. 
Primeval, but primitive? This seemingly simple attempt to justify the "evil" or 
'injustice in the world is startlingly effective. The vein runs deep through the course of. 
human philosophy, "merely consult Calvin and Luther." Before that, there is no 
doubt that thls beliefundergirded the culture and customs of the Greeks, our 
intellectual and philosophical fathers; pedestal dwellers in our modem age. The glory 
9fthe kill, the courage in combat, the honor gained at the edge of a blade; all foci of 
the Greek myths and legends, from Hercules to Hector, are values and attributes 
dependent on the spectator. The trials of Odysseus would be meaningless without the 
backdrop of divine play, but as it is, his tenacity and ingenuity have passed down 
through the ages. 
This insistence, that the lives and deeds of men were under close cosmic 
scrutiny, once conceived; permeated all aspects of Greek culture. It became an 
integral part of even their daily moral philosophies. As a precursor to the Christian 
conception of a watchful God; the Greeks believed all of their world to be as a stage 
.. i 
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.for the enjoyment of their gods. They were a "nation of actors" and as such could not 
imagine that the fruits of their labor and the products of their pain, their virtue and 
vice, would go quietly into· the inky blaGk. A watcher waited, hidden, celebrating even 
their most bitter defeat. 
· Irrevocably entwined in this paradigm, necessary to its continued belief,· there 
arose the firm conviction in the existence of ftee will. Without it, how else could the 
gods be eternally ·engrossed by the machinations of mortal man?· "The absolute 
spontaneity of man in good and.in evil, was devised above all to furnish a right to the 
idea that the interestofthe gods in man, in human virtue, could never be exhausted." So 
naturally, Ni~tzsche notes with some sarcasm, the philosophers were left with no real 
choice but to dispose of the deterministic world. The ancient world, of public 
spectacles and festivals, had a fondness for and felt an obligation toward the 
Spectator, as filling' an-important natural role in the world, ·"and, as aforesaid, even in 
great punishment there is so much that is festive!" 
Section8 
"The.feeling of guilt, of personal obligation, had its origin, as we saw, in the 
oldest arid most primitive personal relationship, that between buyer and seller, 
creditor and debtor: it was here that one person first encountered another person, 
that one person first measured himself against another." 
Every configuration which modem study would deem fit to bestow upon the 
title of cwilization has included some sort of interpersonal measuring akin to the 
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• • .creditor-debtor relationship.- This unique and natural composition allows for a 
· material balance with :which to weigh one individual against another. The measure of 
what is had and what is owed, what can the individual provide for itself and what does 
it.require from others, was and is an effective method of judging the value of the 
individual . ., This earliest form of communication, nay communi!)! itself, was the heart of 
human growth and evolution .. From the simplest trade, the mind of man wrapped 
around this notion·and it grew with a thousand customs, bylaws, traditions, and 
. , , · . exceptions . .The creditor-debtor relationship spurred the intellectual growth of the 
human animal, further separating it from the rest of the kingdom; and this did not 
pass unnoticed by its practitioners. Here we sec the beginning of man's impressive 
mental faculties and the belief that it somehow put him above the fray. 
"Buying and selling, together with their psychological appurtenances, are 
older even than the beginnings of any kind of social forms of organization and 
alliances." It was the valuating eye, accustomed and trained by the enthusiastic 
embrace with which man held fast.to his apparent evolution to the complexities of the 
creditor-debtor relationship, which colored the creation of all other social compacts. 
· Buying and selling, measuring, and the like became the lens through which man 
viewed.his world; he learned to "size things up," and judge with his eyes on a basis of 
marketable va)ue. As Nietzsche says is typical for a budding animal, wallowing in its 
own exceptional nature and its apparent success, it sank its teeth into the notion and 
never let go. This type of evaluatioll' became a lifestyle, no longer quartered to one 
sliver of interaction; ~'characteristic of the thinking of primitive mankind, which is 
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, · · , hard to setin·motion but-then p'roceeds:inexorably in the same direction." Emerge a 
world riewly·conceptualized by the maxim: Everything has a price. 
Thus.was minted a new notion.-0fJustice. All moral and ethical·suppositions 
stem from. this flow; this idea that every action can be translated into a giving and a 
taking; that an objective value can be-placed on every action. The natural conclusion 
being-that these evaluations can be manipulated as easily, and with as seamless 
finality, as• the numbers betwe1m a creditor and a debtor. This is how comparable 
powers grew to interaet and understand one another, on a basis of give-and-take, but 
only comparable powers. The strong and the weak became further separated, as the 
weak could ·not contend on the same ground as the strong; the notion that these rules 
should transcend the boundaries of power is an all too modem idea. The strong 
could.continue.as they always had, but the weak had no recourse but to find their own 
.way.to stand next to the strong, in a way which they could not individually. 
Section 9 
"The community, too; stands to its members in that same vital basic relation, 
that of the creditor and the debtors." 
Entering into a community, living within its boundaries and enjoying the 
· freedoms and securities that it so offers, is, like many great men such as Locke and 
Hobbes have theorized, akin to entering into a contract among men. The advantages 
of society are numerous and mostly taken for granted in this day and age, as living · 
without a society seems-nigh impossible. The existence of the community and its 
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rules, as.they have been agreed upon or enforced, either through democracy or. 
tyranny, it makes little necessary difference in the spirit, protects the individual from 
the inequities of life among .the lawless -and the harshness of life among the elements. 
Rules, and the powers.which enforce them, protect the individual and his property 
from th.ose within and without the community; those within are trusted to behave 
according to the code or else face the consequences, and those outside the community 
are not trusted at all.- The amassing of buildings and public works protect the lone 
man from battling the elements by his self, city walls protect all equally. But the 
citizen only enjoys these protections, and the liberties which they afford, as long as the 
citizen agrees to follow the rules laid down by the community. This is a give-and-
take, as between creditors and debtors; the community will protect the citizen; if the 
citizen protects the community by obeying the rules. 
· "What will happen if this pledge is broken?". In this case, the community, 
which is the creditcir, has the right to exact compensation, and this compensation will 
surely be grave. For a transgression against the community stands as a special sort of 
transgression, a uniquely spiteful violation of the age-old relation, oft broken, between 
creditcir and debtor. Not only has the debtor already partaken of the goods of the 
creditor, by living "within the walls and security of the community for a period of time 
and taking advantage of the·nature of such a civilized community to the point of 
taking an action which would have been more personally defended against outside of 
the community, but has also attacked the creditor himself. The creditor in this case is . 
the community.as a whole, .and as individuals, and the lawless debtor attacks all of 
33 
them when he ·violates the rule oflaw which makes community life possible. As a 
result, the creditor is-within .its rights. to punish the offender, and what could be more 
effective than by reminding them how much the benefits of society are actually worth. 
The debtor is therefore.exiled, forced to dwell once more in a savage world, 
unrefined by a code of conduct or rule oflaw. Stripped of all protection, the offender 
can truly know what it is that has been enjoyed, and betrayed, at the creditor's 
expense. At this point, the offender is .not only at the mercy of 1he elements and the 
· exiled, but also the community to which they no longer belong. "'Punishment' at this 
level of civilization is simply a copy, a mi.mus, of the normal attitude toward a hated, 
disarmed, prostrated enemy, who ·has lost not only every right and protection, but all 
hope of quarter as well." Those which violate the contract between society and the 
individual are at war with the .society, as repeated and growing attacks from within 
will destroy a small society as surely as any outside force, thus the punishments and 
traditions regarding lawbreakers within the society are derivations of the practices of 
war in the society .. 
Section 10 
"As its power increases, a community'ceases to take the individual's 
transgressions so seriously, because they can no longer be considered as dangerous 
and c;!estructive to the whole as they were formerly." 
· At its formation is when a society is most vulnerable. As time passes, 
institutions, traditions and customs cement themselves into the minds and hearts of 
·the people. Ideally; their devotion to-society will renew and invigorate these societal 
norms as. required °until eventually it becomes second nature. Once a society has 
proven itself over time to be an effective way oflife, it will be maintained by those 
which it maintains. The most important tradition in a civilized society is law. As 
society grows.and st,engthens, the rule oflaw evolves. The stronger the society, the 
more forgiving the code. 
In the beginning, a society is held together only by the will of the people, a 
conscious, daring will that is necessary when undertaking any great task, not the will 
which. compels most citizens to follow through with the expectations which 
generations of society have forged. Thus any crime reflects a faltering in the general 
will and poses a great threat to the ideological experiment which is the creation of a 
society. For this reason, early codes of behavior and the punishments for violati'on 
were extremely strict. As Nietzsche·noted, those debtors which would harm the 
creditorsstate were· cast out and treated as hostile enemies of war. But as the years 
march on, a great inversion occurs, and it requires more will to break out of societal 
norms than to follow them; the nation-state achieves a level of stability and security. 
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At this point, it is no longer necessary to completely destroy and defile those 
who would cast offense against the state. The state holds a power decidedly larger 
than any individual and thus feels comfortable in allowing the offender to atone or 
make up for his crimes. Exile and death become the exception, not the rule. Minor 
offenders are allowed back into the fold, and only those whose actions direly threaten 
the safety of society, actions such as treason or mass murder, are treated as enemies of 
. _ war. All other minor offenders, though they attacked the benevolent creditor, are 
protected from the-whims of the injured and instead are dealt with according.to the. 
rules of the now strengthened state. -The desire of the state has changed; whereas 
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· before, harshness and cruelty served to dissuade all potential dangers to the state, now 
the. state is interested in quarantining any disturbance so that it cannot grow and 
become a danger to the state: One-murder will not tear down a powerful state, riots 
may. 
Once offenses- to the societal norms are no longer viewed as necessarily 
treasonous to some degree, the need for other punishments arises. At this moment 
the legal code is forced to evolve. In the case of Western civilization, there arose the 
idea that for every harm· there would be a manner of recompense which would not 
necessarily right the wrong, but would serve as penance for the violator. The legal 
system began -codifying equivalent punishment& for various crimes, instead of exiling 
. -. all violating debtors .. At the same time as this idea, that for all wrongdoing there was 
a path to make it right, began; there also began a systematic distancing of the agent 
from the action. An individual could compensate the state or the- citizens for 
wrongdoing and then continue, unblemished. These evolutions demonstrate marked 
change-from the bloodthirsty "law" of old, but they only last as long as the state feels 
.powerful. When society finds itself on precarious ground, it will again declare war 
upon affdishonest debtors. Until then, "How much injury he can endure without 
suffering from it becomes the actual measure of his wealth." 
"The"justice which began with, 'everything is dischargea,ble, everything must 
1/ 
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be discharged,' ends. by winking and letting those incapable of discharging their debt 
go free: it ends, as doe~ every good·thing on earth, by overcoming itself." Nietzsche 
identifies this·phenomenon, one above justice, above creditors and debtors, as mercy. 
The greatest'power resides within those who hold so much power, that they have no 
need to exercise it. 
Section 11 
"Here ·a word in repudiation of attempts that have lately been made to seek 
the origin of justice in quite a different sphere - namely in that of ressentiment." 
Nietzsche notes that it may have been in vogue in his time to search for the 
origins of justice in the reactive, bitter.feelings of the injured, these psychologists had it 
completely wrong. By their reasoning, justice rose frail) revenge and thus had 
nothing more at its core than a kneejerk reaction to being wronged; nothing more,. 
nothing less. This marked but one part of a larger academic .wave which sought to 
institutionalize and aggrandize the reactive notions of those too small, too weak, or 
toci scared to act. Nietzsche sees no problem with addressing these reactive feelings, 
which are a·natural part of being human, but the answer should be to overcome 
these, quite literally, base reactions in lieu of positive, active modes of expression. 
Fittingly, Nietzsche states that' at the core of such aggrandizement of ressentiment lies 
rersentiment' itsell1 In the spirit of "scientific fairness" by which the weaker minds seek 
to"-find the good in every flaw, so as to not call it a flaw but merely difference, the 
reactive emotions such as jealousy, revenge and mistrust, hallmarks and keystones of 
37 
• the weakest; are lauded.· However; this same vision, which claims to find the utility 
arid goodness in .even the darkest places, shuts its eyes tightly against the uglier active 
equivalents, such as thdust for. power, and condemns them. It condemns them even 
though the active forces inside mankind brought him farther than the reactive ever 
could. Of course, fear makes it easy to condemn power in others, as easy as it is to 
praise impotence. 
'.'As for [the] specific proposition that the home of justice is to be sought in the 
sphere of reactive feelings, ohe is obliged for truth's sake to counter it with a blunt 
antithesis: the last sphere to ·be ·conquered by the spirit of justice is the sphere of 
reactiv« feelings!" Because, quite simply, an individual who is just treats a man fairly, 
. · according to what is just, and ·not based on a personal reaction such as jealousy or 
revenge. Those reactive tendencies actually cause the mind to stray from justice, not 
draw towards it. The reactive.man cannot help but take into·special account the 
pe~oi:ial \VI"ongs felt at the hands of the one being judged. The active man does not 
. W!llt for .the world around him to influence his judgment and tell him how to feel. 
The active man is comfortable in his own self-worth and thus hands down justice as is 
fitting, regardless of his personal stake in the matter. He is "a hundred steps closer to 
justice than the.reactive man ... has in fact also had at all times a freer eye, a better 
conscience on his side: conversely, one can see who has the invention of "bad 
conscience" on his conscience - the mari of ressentiment!" 
Nietzsche suggests that we turn to history to discover the true nature of justice 
· and law._ The impetus behind the formation of society and the codes which govern its 
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people and practi~es is certainly not in the reactive side of the populace. The reactive 
do not create from nothing; they hijack the already instituted and morph them from 
,the inside: , This may not all necessanly be incorrect or misguided; but it is certainly 
not responsible for ,creation nor is it revolutionary. Creation and revolution are acts 
of force and will. They are undertakings which are demanding, physically and 
mentally, upon all who -would attempt them. The "active, strong, spontaneous, 
aggressive" individuals in society are the ones who create the world around them, and 
.cr.eate the world around their fellow citizens. The reactive popula.tion simply lives 
there and reacts. In fact, according to Nietzsche, far from finding its roots in the 
reactive; the law is the result of the efforts of the active and aggressive who wished to 
protect the people and society from the oft-overwhelming and unthinking bilious 
nature of the.reactive; the reactive whose justice is clouded by personal grudges and 
emotions . 
. Justice in society is the suppression of the natural instincts of the reactive, the 
ressentiment; .by the stronger powers in society, whether they be individuals, or the 
institutions they leave behind. Institutions of justice serve to distract the reactive 
rabble from their .feelings of injustice and anger; to transform their wrath, or at least 
dilute 'it into something more akin to justice, something quite different from revenge. 
These institutions do this in three ways. They take the erring debtor out of the hands 
of those that have been wronged and into the impartial fold of the justice system, 
which theoretically is unbiased and procedurally sound. They divert anger from the 
offending agent by portraying .the real enemy as being the destruction oflaw and 
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order, from either side, and not-one.individual offense. Lastly, they codify what have 
been determined as, proper compensatory measures for catalogued offenses, offering 
intellectual assurance that justice-can be achieved through tried and tested means. 
The combiriation of all three is what-is called the institution and rule oflaw. Once 
this has been established, the society will, ideally, gather around the protection of its 
theory of justice not the individual. Before the inception oflaw, there was nothing for 
the citizenry to rally around except self-interest. 
The concept ofjustice,justice itself, was created by man upon the creation of 
the institutions and rules oflaw. Outside of the rules of man, there is no such thing as 
a just or unjust action, there is simply. action. Life acts out of necessity, and the animal 
kingdom reflects this.· Killing, theft, and deception are natural acts which animals 
perform in order to survive. It is a bloodthirsty world for the animal kingdom, one 
which humans are a part of no matter how hard they may try to separate themselves, 
and there are· no rules: There is no right and wrong, there is only survival. Violence 
and destruction·are some of the "basic functions" of life and it "simply cannot be 
thought ofat all without this character." 
It follows from this, the necessity of violence for survival, that any rules which 
would impair an individual's ability to discharge and act upon these instincts are 
"exceptional conditions," that is, they arc jettisoned at the first sign of mortal danger. 
The legal codes are exactly that, exceptional conditions, and therefore so is the 
creation dependent on them - justice. Justice, because it is directly opposed to the will 
oflife, is an:artificial restriction; and being a restriction that can· be broken should the 
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will be strong enough, is sure/y not a real restriction at all. But it serves a grand 
purpose;. placed high enough on the pedestal and it serves as a beacon to follow and 
an avatar to protect, gaining supremacy over .all as an arbiter between powers in 
order to prevent conflict from arising and consuming the state. But while such a 
creation would empower the state and the theory of justice, it would serve to impede 
even the strongest-willed m~n. Even those strong enough to assert their power 
~eyond the moral boundaries cif their fellow men would be forced to deal with the 
repercussicins of.the assembled wrath of the masses; such a wrath that even the 
strongest may not be able to endure. According to Nietzsche, this constriction was 
"an agent of the dissolution and destruction of man, an attempt to assassinate the 
· future of man, a sign of weariness, a secret path to nothingness." 
Section 12 
"Yet a word .on the origin and the purpose of punishment -:- two problems that 
are separate,. or ought to be separate: unfortunately, they are usually confounded." 
In seeking the answers to these questions, Nietzsche again finds the work that 
was laid down by genealogists that had come before him as insufficient and 
egregiously flawed. Their efforts were doomed to fail because they misunderstood the 
fundamental laws behind the evolution of an entity, be it an animal, custom, or land. 
Previous genealogi~ts sought the origin of the thing within its purpose, believing that 
finding the purpose of a custom, even if it were centuries old, revealed the reason for . 
. its inception. This, according to Nietzsche, is not true for the purpose oflaw and is 
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not any truer for punishment. The most important notion to remember when 
attempting to understand anything. on.an historic scale is that "the cause of the origin 
of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment and place in a system of 
purposes, lie worlds apart;".this·flies in the face of years of historiographer's theories, 
The conflation of.the origin and the purpose of a thing ignores the fact that 
everything in the world js a product .of cycles of subduing powers,. cycles of evolution, 
That is the fundamental aspect that historiographers of the past failed to realize. All 
action in the world is a process of subjugation, as worldly powers combat for 
dominance and the winner paints the world according to his tastes. Every time this 
occurs, the meaning and purpose of the objects within the world changes; because of 
this, the contemporary purpose of the thing has no necessary bearing on the context 
of its creation. · This applies as equally to the schoolhouse turned barracks in a 
conquered state.as it does to the values and morals held by the populace. 
"Purposes and utilities are only signs that a will to power has become master of 
something less powerful· and imposed upon it the character of a function." Thus, the 
history of a thing is the story of successive wills; an unbroken evolution of 
reinterpretation which does not necessarily follow any logical pr(!gression. There is no 
preordained goal, no plan set in motion at the moment of inception, simply the first 
will shaping the world and exposing its creation to the wills around it. What remains 
· as the end of the day, when the dust has settled, likely holds little in common with the 
original. "The form is fluid, but the 'meaning' is even more so." 
. These same rules, which govern the evolution of concepts and customs, such 
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as puriishment, can also be seen .in the evolution of individual qrganisms. Even with 
regards to mental.processes and creations, evolution is organic, and sometimes 
violent . When the organism as a whole evolves, it is common for the purpose of the 
mechanisms, the organs, which maintain the organism to morph as well. Growth 
means pain; and sometimes this pain means the destruction of c9mponent parts, 
· shedding outdated.organs or appropriating the resources elsewhere. But this 
destruction, the shedding offormerly,important, perhaps necessary, elements, should 
not be viewed as a .weakening; removal or elimination of superfluous organs "can be a 
sign of increasing strength and perfection." As the thing evolves, it retains efficiency 
by no longer maintaining the parts it does not need. It is the way of the world, as 
.mentioned above, that every change occurs as the result of a stronger power subduing 
any_ number of smaller powers. But their consequent deaths do not mean that the 
sum.total is a loss; what results could, should, be stronger than what remained, as well 
as different,. Nietzsche goes as far as to say that the magnitude of this change, and the 
. strength of the resultant .entity, 'could be measured by the mass of what had to be 
sacrificed in order to achieve it. 
"I emphasize this major point of historical method all the more because it is in 
fundamental opposition to the.now· prevalent instinct and taste which would rather be 
reconciled even to the absolute-fortuitousness, even the mechanistic senselessness of all 
events than to the theory that in all events a will to power is operating." Nietzsche 
decries these modem theories, one he says is the result of a "democratic idiosyncrasy," 
. which would-rather believe in romantic views of progress which preserve the illusion 
,•,. 
of complete interpersonal equality than face the brutal reality ofa world forged by 
. will. rormer genealogists placed their faith in a Hegel-esque idea of a progressive 
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. spirit which.guides the nature of the _world towards a "fortuitous" end; warmed by the 
.idea that .despite their worst mistakes, the world will get better. That; or they 
... subscribed to· the belief that the world moved with no guidance, from. a divine spirit or 
human.action. In both cases, the believer is able to find solace; either in the idea that 
their present or future is being guided, or, at least, that it is not completely a result of 
.. their.strength or lack-thereof.- 'Both of these exculpate the agent from the situation in 
which he I]lay find himself. They grant this salvation by denying the truth; that life is 
· a battle of wills and one has only oneself to blame for their station. As Machiavelli 
asserted in The Prince, fortune only topples those who are too weak or unprepared to 
combat it. 1. But.it is the way·of modern man, to deny that one man is better than 
another in any meaningful way. They will accept that the world is a violent place, but 
ne_ver that the will to:·dominate is the only thing that makes it turn. 
This fantasy, this unwillingness to embrace the active nature of the human 
experience, has permeated every aspect of society, according to Nietzsche. It has 
. gone far beyond menial matters of interpersonal relationships or mass meilia and 
spread to the educatio"nal loci of the state. Any study of the natural world and the 
. study of man has been hijacked by the prejuilice against the value· of activity and will. 
Instead, the reactive side of man has been magnified and the secondary activity has 
.
1 Machiavelli, Niccolo . .The. Prince.· Edited by Harvey Mansfield. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1998. Page 60. 
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been raised supreme. Reaction is always secondary to action, and to place sup~emacy 
on the secondary, to praise and recommend a life in the secondary· sphere is to cripple 
the possibility of man. T_o live in a state ofreaction is to lead a life. of passivity; to 
realize true potential, one has to take action and create the life and world that is 
·desired. Modem cowardice and weakness has led to a distaste and disdain for any 
sign of aggressive expansion or dominance, and the social drive which was once meant 
to foster such attempts at greatness now serves to constrict it. Nietzsche warns, 
however, that it is only through these "form-giving forces that give new . 
interpretations.and directions" that adaptation takes place, and the organism as a 
who/,e evolves. 
Section 13 
."To return ta our subject, namely punishment, one must distinguish two aspects: 
on the one hand, that in it which is relatively enduring, ... cin the other, that in it which 
is flui.d." 
. Nietzsche further disentangles the evolutionary past of what is now called 
'punishment' by first distinguishing between act and the intention. The act of 
punishing, those physical motions which entail punishment, are the enduring aspect. 
They are not metaphysically connected with any certain, fixed intention. The 
intention behind punishment is the fluid aspect, and this is the purpose; the purpose 
which Nietzsche earlier said was mistakenly used to chart its origin. The intention 
.and the act are separate; this allows for the intention to change through time although 
the act, .aside from various.technological bells and whistles, stays the same. The 
mechanics. of punishment had existed for a long time before the concept of 
punishment was transplanted onto it. 
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This fluid element, the purpose, is the result of generations of wills, each 
subduing those before it·and creating new purpose in the freshly forged world. 
Because -of this, the history. of the purpose of a thing is immensely hard to determine, 
nigh impossible. Loaded into the investigation is the entire history of the act, not the 
· · purpose, and all of the.purposes for which the act was once important. As mentioned 
above, these transformations are the result of battles for dominance, strength, not logic. 
The chain of purposes does hot necessarily have any reasonable path which can l:ie · 
tracked. Unraveling-this mystery today is most likely impossible; says Nietzsche, "only 
that which has no history is definable:" One has to look earlier in man's history, his 
prel\istory, to seek the simpler, more original purpose behind the act of punishment; 
before the wills of m_en, or eventually society, man en masse, reshaped it. Each time the 
transformation pushed new aspects to the foreground, emphasized different ideals; 
Nietzsche theorized that the last transformation place deterrence above all else. 
To emphasize this lack of understanding, perhaps the impossibility of ever 
understanding, Nietzsche points out the multitude of purposes which punishment now 
serves, all and none. The point being, that this act which plays such a large role in 
society, in so many important arenas, has no definitive purpose. Although the act is 
concrete, it can be applied in countless ways: to render hannless the dangerous; 
·compensation to the injured; to isolate a disturbance by removing the agent from 
r. 
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informal retribution; to strike· fear. into the populace; to celebrate the defeat of one's 
en·emies; to make a ·memory; etc, Punishment has so many applications in society, 
but today-people.do not really wl!)!. There is not an answer as to the utility of the act 
or why it was·ever begun in the·first place. At an early age, perhaps the concept of 
punishmentcauld have been understood and maybe even directed, but at this point, 
in -this high society; the reasons for brutality are quite accidental., 
Section 14 
"It is clear that punishment is overdetermined by utilities of all lcinds. All the 
more reason, then, for .deducing from it a supposed utility that, to be sure, counts in the 
popular consciousness as the most essential one." 
This essential utility, which, beyond all of the other countless reasons, justifies 
the brutal nature and the ·bloody history which punishment brings into society, is the· 
notion that punishment from soi:iety is the surest way in which to make the guilty 
· party punish :itself. That is, punishment serves to invigorate the conscience which 
· must have been absent·before the deed was done. The backlash from society, 
somehow, is the only way that the guilty party can be made to realize they are, in fact, 
guilty. Put it this way, punishing someone could be viewed as malcing them a better 
person because it is awakening the better part of their nature. This is a gross 
misunderstanding of the human ·condition, and its psychological reactions to violence 
and it is this misunderstanding which also gave birth to what Nietzsche calls the "bad 
conscience;" the barriers. and feelings which ascetics have created and tried to 
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legitimize through punishment. 
The one gaping flaw which Nietzsche points out is that these men being 
punished, these individuals who have already shown disregard for society and the 
other people in it, are not the type of people who are prone to these sorts of feelings in 
the first place .. If these individuals were susceptible to them, they likely would not 
have violated the law at all. No, these are not the people whom punishment makes 
better; if any such exist; "Generally speaking, punishment makes men hard and cold." 
In the strong, the truly dangerous, punishment has the opposite effect as intended; it 
isolates but empowers. It instills self-reliance and destroys empathy, precisely the 
opposite of what is needed to rehabilitate one into society. ·Those whom punishment 
does p.ot strengthen;it destroys utterly, and the sight of a broken man should appeal 
to none. 
This outcome,. opposite as intended, is easily explained by looking into the 
·,history which mall' has left. 'Jn Nietzsche's estimation, it is exactly punishment which, 
for generations, served to most effectively destroy feelings of guilt in the punished 
individual. Not only does the individual experience the isolation and self-reliance 
· nurtured by punishment, but the act of punishing also prevents the supposed violator 
froin viewing his actions as wrong, morally, in themselves. The very actions of the 
justice system can mirror those of the perpetrator, extended to but not limited to 
.violence, coercion, and kidnapping.(imprisonment, if you prefer), but somehow these 
: actions are viewed as suitable for society. This is compounded by the fact that the 
justice system has no· emotional motive; its only supposed motive is a reaction to the 
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. improp~r action of.another,: yet it indulges in the supposedly immoral actions to 
punish .. The lesson which the punished learn from such an incident is not that any of 
: the particular actions taken as being categorically wrong, but only when taken by 
certain people within the hierarchy and towards certain ends. The question left, then, 
is how to gain the power.necessary for society to allow such expression of power. 
These·people, these alienated loners, are not the ones who gave birth to guilt, 
morals,• or the bad conscience. These ,are the ones who expressed their will to power 
as best they could•and·dared society, the true holders of the bad conscience, to stop 
them. In fact, for the longest time in the history of punishment, the entire concept of 
guilt was alien to both the judge and the judged. The offender did not suffer himself, 
·. punishing himself for his 'wrongs,' and the judge did not harm the offender in defense 
of any moral claim. An offender was merely something harmful that society would be 
· better off without, like glass on the road. Any individuals which ~ould place the 
society in danger are dealt with as such. 
Section 15 
· "This fact once came insidiously into the mind of Spinoza, when one 
afternoon, teased by who knows what recollection, he mused on the question of what 
really remained to him of the famous morsus conscientiae" 
· Spinoza, like Nietzsche after him, asserted that the moral categories of good 
and .evil were nothing more than human creations and had no correlation with the 
natural,.or godly, world. To Spinoza this was self-evident, as these concepts could not 
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possibly have-any·place in th~ world of an omniscient, omnipotent God. God is only 
• truly all"powerful if there ar-e no such"constraints on his behavior. Spinoza's God is a 
free.god;-at liberty to take whatever action at any time; Nietzsche seeks to free man in 
. the sam<: way .. Similar to Spinoza, Nietzsche is taking humanity back to a more 
innocent age,-an,innocentworld, where the moral constructions of man do not limit 
their potential and vilify the natural world. 
, But the question would remain for Spinoza: what has,happened to the morsus 
conscientiae,.the-.bad conscience? -For Spinoza, an unfortunate ·outcome, be it 
punishment, pain, ·or even death, is not cause-for guilt or self-abasement. Instead, 
there is merdy·a feeling of sadness, of disappointment, that whatever had preceded 
this moment was not what had been hoped. Instead of wallowing in feelings of moral 
despair, one is expected to learn and overcome, For centuries, this had been the case; 
as captured i:rimirials thought not of'.their moral failings, but of their misfortune at 
being caught: The error, it wDuld seem to them, was in the planning or execution, · 
not the idea. Punishment was not a moral judgment, but a pragmatic one; and would 
be faced as such, 
It is only logical that the wrongdoers would then learn their lesson in 
pragmatic terms. Punishment did not serve to bolster the moral standing of the 
punished; it instead sharpened a sense of prudence in the punished. Upon receiving 
punishment, the lesson.learned was to not get caught, not to be a oetter person. 
Punishment was the price of crossing .the boundaries of one's own abilities. Receiving 
a punishment from society would then be comparable to sustaining wounds in a hunt. 
~ •. " 
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Th~ problem is not.one,of morality, but of ability. A man must train .and take care in 
.order.to huntthe mosfglorious prey; similarly, he must plan arid take care when 
asserting his "will over fellow men. Being caught and punished merely means that one 
was not·strong, quick, or.fast enough. Punishment lets man know where his limits 
·are; at 1east.temporarily; but it does not instill moral value, it does not 'better' him. 
What·can be expected;according to Nietzsche, is "an increase in fear, a heightening 
.of prudence, mastery of the desires: thus punishment tames men, but it does not make 
them 'better' - one might with more justice assert the opposite.''. A tame man is one 
who does not press the boundaries of himself or society. A tame man is one who does 
not strive for; or achieve, greatness. A tame man is not remembered. 
Section 16 
'.'At this point l can no longer avoid giving a first, provisional statement of my 
owri hypothesis concerning .the origin of the 'bad conscience' ... I regard the bad 
. conscience as the serious illness that man was bound to contract under the stress of 
the most fundamental change he ever experienced - that change which occurred 
when he found himself finally enclosed within the walls of society and peace." 
To· Nietzsche, this tremendous change, from a ·world of complete self-reliance 
and fear of the elements to a communal understanding and apparent safety, was as 
disconcerting as the shift from life in the sea to life on land. Man, in society, finds 
himself out of his element. Just as the first land creatures were forced to abandon age-
old instincts and adaptations, man was forced to forgo the fundamental aspects of 
survival which had led him so well for so long. Society was as. new an environment 
for man, as dry land once was-to all.creatures. All of the instincts and drives which 
had guided mari through the world became quite suddenly obsolete and improper. 
Man was forced to live in a completely new way, and such a transformation is not 
· easy. All new·solutions had to be discovered in the face of all new challenges. The 
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. instincts which were. man's nature were no longer sufficient and all he had to (ely on 
was consciousness, which Nietzsche calls the "weakest and most fallible organ." This 
.. orgari was the only remaining tool which men had to seek the new. answers, to 
develop new instincts, which would guide them through a completely new world. But 
the instincts of old were not dead, and the appetites which man previously could, and 
shoul.d, indulge did notdie either. These urges, which could not be killed without 
killing the animal, were forced to find subtler, hidden discharges. 
"All instincts. that do not discharge themselves outwardly tum inward- this is 
. what I call the internalization of man." This inward action, this conglomerate of drive 
and instinct, is what Nietzsche identifies as the soul of man. The soul is not something 
divine or spiritual, but the fettered energy of man's instincts which once roamed free, 
when man was free. The inner world of man the animal used to be minimal, as man 
was free to express his desires, wants, and views. Man was once able to shape the 
world as much as he could possibly wish, expending energy and power when the 
· whim would strike. The emergence of society, and the binding of man to the rules 
which dictate it, put an end to this free expression and forced its power inward, 
toward the individual. Punishment arose as the capital means of prohibiting these 
, •.,. dangerous.expressions ofwill and power from destroying society, and this pressure 
from the multitudes reflected these powerful, dangerous instincts back upon those 
. · · , who would.exercise them_· Punishment was, and is, the all too human desire for 
aggression; violence, and pain distorted and reflected back against the originators. 
This, according to Nietzsche, is the bad conscience. 
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This hypocritical distortion was the impetus for man's most destmctive illness -
-man becoming sick ef himself. Once marr was made to see his own instincts as morally 
· · wrong, once he was.made to see that he himself, by nature, was inherently bad, he 
bound himself. The very instincts which has led man to his success, which had 
allowed him to propagate, survive, and thrive, were shunned and man was left in the 
. dark. B!lt in this darkness, under attack from his very soul, man created something 
hitherto unseen on earth, the divine. ·Created to justify his eternal, internal suffering, 
man gave.birth to god, so:that all could see his pain. But as crippling and damaging 
as ·this may-have been, and surely the effects can still be seen today, these unique 
conceptions also ma_de man something entirely different from any other animal and as 
such became open to an entirely different future which could lead to unfathomable 
heights or depths. 
Section 17 
"Among the presuppositions of this hypothesis concerning the origin of the 
bad conscience is, first, that the change referred to was not a gradual or voluntary 
one: .. Secondly, however, that the welding of a hitherto unchecked and shapeless 
,, '1 
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populace into a firm.form was not only instituted by an act of violence but also carried 
.to its conclusion by nothing but acts of violence." 
Nietzsche's theory demands a·particularly cruel history of the formation of 
the state. Unlike:the biological organism which slowly finds itself adapted to the 
world around it, the change in the life of man the animal, from the shifting nature of 
the nomad to the solid position of a member of society, was sudden and disruptive . 
. Man did not ease into a new·lifestyle, but was jarred into it, and the only remaining 
question is how:• To this Nietzsche proposes the only rational .answer he can provide, 
discounting the divine, mystical, or otherwise illogical explanations such as the 
Hegelian Spirit, and that is the force of other men. This force would naturally be 
violence. Oppression of the many to the will of the powerful few is what makes a state 
from a wandering crowd . 
. The rise of the first state, according to Nietzsche, had noµiing to do with 
contracts, such as.:John Locke and Thomas Hobbes would have. people believe . 
. These ideas are nothing more than noble sentimentalism by those unwilling to accept 
the basic nature of man as a conqueror, not a contractor. The first state was made 
through violence, as the first conquerors, being undisputed masters of combat and 
coordination, warfare and organization, were able to force the many to the will of the 
few._ This conquering tribe, first to realize the importance and possibili/y of the 
subjugation of the weak for the strong, had no place in their hearts for contracts. The 
powerful do not contract with the powerless, they force their- way upon them. That is 
simply the nature of the powerful; they shape the world to their will, not out of spite 
,. ' 
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· or grand designs, but by instinct. 
The true masters of men cannot help but transform the world .. Like great 
artists, they do not smother.themselves with.doubt, they do not regret their creations, 
and they cannot stop. They are what they are and act accordingly with no thought 
fm: guilt.or responsibility to the other .. Their creation, their expression of their will, is 
of paramount importance: "It is not in them that the 'bad conscience' developed ... 
but it would not have developed without them." 
The imposition of order, of a place in the new state, had an undeniably huge 
· · impact on ·the evolution of man. Though the prehistoric conquerors did not create 
the bad conscience, their subjugation of the weak made it an eventuality. Drafted 
into a society they did. not create or rule, the weak were forced into a low place with 
little power and no rights. The weak, above all else, lost their freedom to the 
conquerors, And once this instinct for freedom, which is present in all men, was 
oppressed, it, as mentioned· above, turned inward. The desire for freedom, for power, 
unable to discharge outwardly from the weak, festering inside; is the origin of the bad 
conscience. 
Section 18 
"Fundamentally it is·the same active force that is at work on a grander scale in 
those artists of.violence and organiz~rs who build states, and, that here, internally, on 
a smaller and pettier scale ... creates-for itself a bad conscience and builds negative 
ideals." 
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. The natural desire in man to dominate, to violently form the world to his 
... image, is the same power which: the corrupted man used to tear himself apart. The 
same will In power which drove the. blonde beasts of old to conquer those beneath them 
and create a:state which could magnify their power, the same drive which possessed 
the potency to change the world forever, also, aimed within, at oneself, transformed 
the nature ofinan. As forcefully as it defeated the wandering tribes of prehistoric 
ti!lles,, the will to poweP, now forced •within seeks to defeat the very man who wields it. 
In the absence of-any external discharge, and no longer free to ravage the other, this 
violent instinct of. man, which cannot be avoided, ravages the ancient ideals and 
instincts. With ·no one else to torture, man endeavors to make himself suffer. This 
utterly negative creation, .the likes which the world had never before seen, "a soul 
. , . voluntarily at:odds,with· itself," this new and fertile and terrible inner landscape 
'brought forth·all of the ideals of man's construction, the negative and the positive. 
. With this insight into the nature of man's 'soul' and suffering, one can finally 
decode the mystery of the supposed beauty of selflessness, self-denial, and self-
.. sacrifice. This abuse of the self represents the most satisfactory expression of violence 
and delight in cruelty that is not only socially acceptable, but praised. The joy of the 
ascetic.is the same joy.once felt by the ancient tribes when destroying the other. 
Thus, the moral value of the "unegoistic" becomes questionable .to say the least - · 
"Only the bad conscience, only the will to self-maltreatment provided the conditions 
for the value of the unegoistic." 
Section 19 
. "The bad conscience is.an ·illness, there is no doubt aboutthat, but.an illness 
as pregnancy is an illness." 
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With this, Nietzsche is saying that although the creation- of the bad conscience 
may be seen as something usurping or even damaging that which created it, it also 
marks .the possibility of the rise of something new. Perhaps, like a child, this is 
something that could be formed, guided into a creation worthy of the demise of the· 
creator. But to understand exactly what potential this bad conscience may have held 
for the human race, and to understand exactly what animal man was when he first 
became pregnant•with the bad conscience, one must again delve into the prehistory of 
man. As before, the relationship between the debtor and the creditor rises to the top. 
However;in this case, the relationship is not between individuals, but generations. 
Early societies, societies whose existence could not be taken for granted by its 
members and whose.collapse was consistently imminent, were marked by a 
particularly strong connection between the generations. The young generation was 
. acutely aware of a debt upon its shoulders, a debt owed to the older generations 
which made not only their individual existence possible, but their communal 
existence .. This indebtedness was especially felt towards the originators, those who 
created the society. This made perfect sense to them, that their ancestors worked and 
sacrificed to create a community, and so as members of the community, and enjoying 
the benefits of society, the present generations would owe their ancestors and "has to 
P'9' them back." This payback could come in many forms. It could be through sacrifice 
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or it could be by conquering the surrounding world in the name of the ancestors. But 
no matter the size of.the feast or the empire, as each generation passes the debt grows. 
Every milestone which ,society sets bolsters the honor of the founders and thus the 
· debt never diminishes. In time, it became clear that the most potent display of 
indebtedness to one's ancestors is obedience. The customs and traditions of society 
, reflect the will of the ancestors, those to whom one is most indebted, .following these 
orders from beyond the grave is the highest worship a member of society can bestow 
upon his ancient benefactors. Then·again, in frenzied times, when the debt weighs 
heaviest, some societies found they could only lighten the burden through blood. 
Despite the magnitude or multitude of sacrifices, the debt can never be paid. 
In fact, the success of a society; its longevity, and its survival, only serve to increase the 
debt. The stronger a society becomes, the more impressive the ancestors seem. As 
society grows, so.does fear ofthe,power of those who created it, and the debt owed to 
them. This feeling grows inside of each and every member of society, and social life 
becomes synonymous.with indebtedness. This fear of the ancestors and their power, 
this debt, can only be eradicated by the destruction of the society and the memory of 
all it had achieved. Just as the growing strength of the state feeds the memory of the 
ancestors, each time this strength is lessened and the power of the state wanes, so does 
the fear ·and the debt; for if the creation has failed, of what use is the creator. 
Conversely, the states which achieve the most success, which grow unimpeded to the 
heights of human creation, truly their ancestors are the things oflegends. These 
ancient tribesmen; who forged the great states from the fires of an untamed world, 
58 
. • ,.. . : whose might rules.for·centµries b'eyond the grave, ascend to the title of gods. Thus,. 
Nietzsche !inds-the:origin of divinity in fear. Those noble hallmarks of divinity-
: piety, grace; compassion i-:'.were .not inherent in the early gods and had nothing to do 
with their worship. 
Section 20 
·. '.'fiistory shows that the consciousness of being in deJ:>t to the qeity did not_ by 
. any,means come to:an end with the organization of communities on the basis of blood 
relationship," 
. :Indeed, these primitive, personal gods and their burdens did not leave man's 
soul at pe'ace. They did not.leave even as the tribes which spawned them·transformed 
· intq stai.es unlik_e their. forbears had ever imagined, as· they became empires. The 
· populations ·of .the world, mosL at· the feet of some. tyrannical tribe or another, 
inherited the gods of their masters, and their values, Whether they were forced to by 
the· edge of: a blade or coerced by social pressure, the oppressed will eventually adopt 
the habits. of their · slavers, bit by bit, piece by piece, the ingrained feeling of 
indebtedness to the divine.ancestors was no exception, nor was the need to be relieved 
of it Through their empires, the early masters, the artists whose medium is the world 
around them, began·a project millennia in the making, deep within the soul of man, 
, Millennia did pass, and what was started at the dawn of man, hissing in his 
sciul, grew, too great and closely approaches its critical ·mass, The burden grew on 
men's backs and in their.souls; 'the guilt and the debt multiplied by generations oflife 
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unpaid for. A cancer this malignant always displays symptoms .in its· host, mankind is 
no eJ<ception: In direct correlation with the growth of the burden, so have the 
concepts of God and divinity. Unable to. discharge the debt of their ancestry through 
life, and unwilling or-unable to. give that· life for the debt; man was forced to be clever. 
Through the creation -of deities, :divinity, noble qualities, and dogma, man found a 
way to'live.fori:he discharge of their debts! The debt, and the proper understanding of 
to whom the debt-was owed, led the tribe to discover an answer as to the question of. 
how to live. An answer, not necessarily the right one or even -a good one. Thus, the 
early history of the tribes of men is preserved in the epics of their gods. Every action 
and struggle . amongst the ·gods of the people reflects their own wandering through 
·issues of nationality, race, custom and value. As the tribes morphed, died, and grew 
so did their influence on the world around them. The strongest tribes .would survive 
and expand, bringing more· and more people into their world; into their values and 
under their. gods. This influx would in tum leave its own mark upon the world into 
which it had entered . 
. "The advance toward universal empires is always also an advance toward 
universal. deities." As the empire grows, so must the religion adapt so as to be 
·compatible with the increasingly. diverse beliefs of the realm. Religion serves a real 
purpose, to· .relieve the burden of living in debt, a feeling deep in the soul of man 
which cannot be 'ignored, and so must be able to reach.· all of the populace. 
Therefore, the larger the· empire becomes the simpler the religion becomes, to an 
extent, for the common man .. This is best represented by the tendency for major 
'· 
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; .. empires-to eventually resort to monotheism. This is exemplified most clearly, to 
Nietzsche, in the Christian God;.the avatar of a monotheistic 'religion which arrived at 
its. current form through ·centuries of compromise and transformation as its empire 
spread and 'incorporated the religious .values and festivals of the conquered people. It 
· worked, and.thtl empire,grew unceasingly, as did the weight.of the burden, the debt. 
But , Nietzsche also presumes · that the empire· could be · falling, that 
Christianity'.s hold oh the soul of man could. be slipping. As faith declines, Nietzsche 
. affirms a "considerable decline rrn mankind's feeling of guilt/' leading him to believe 
.that the.fall of the Christian God could be the saving grace of humanity. Atheism, to 
Nietzsche, shall .set you free. Atheism perhaps could destroy even the belief in a 
burden upon the soul of man, 1'Atheism and a kind of second innocence belong together." 
Section21 
"So much for' a· first brief.pr\:liminary on the connection of the concepts 'guilt' 
and 'duty' with religious presuppositions: I have up to now deliberately ignored the 
moralization of these concepts ... as if these concepts were now necessarily doomed 
since their presupposition;the faith in our 'creditor,' in God, had disappeared. The 
reality is, to a fearful degree, otherwise." 
In reality, the joining of the bad conscience and God was far more powerful 
.than ·man has yet been able to overcome. The primal instincts of guilt and duty and 
the violent, joyous discharge; that had slowly but all too swiftly been deprived of man 
.as he entered the catacombs of society, drove deep into the soul of man, into his bad 
· : mnscience. _:This inner. turmoil; in,conjunction with the perfection of God and the . 
. ·: , ·promise ofafteHife, worked to·halt the progression toward the second innocence 
Nietzsche described. 
. Having . .already been denied the fundamental discharge natural to man and 
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· . : forced to .realign his action to the ·'moral' compass of his bad conscience, the birth of 
God pushed man even deeper into his irreconcilable debt. The existence of God, of 
an even-higher perfection,'aims.to'.''preclude pessimistically, once and for all, the 
, prospect ofa final discharge." Man isto forever remain in debt, as the moralization 
of guilt and.duty turn-the concepts not only against the debtor, as it has always been, 
but upon the creditor. TIJ.e existence of the divine shames even the· most worthy of 
man's tribal ancestors, and .being the creator of man itself, not merely its society, 
.. represents an even-larger-debL Man's history is forever changed; no longer does he 
. come from.noble, proud stoak, ·but from the wretched and indebted. Whether it's the 
Christian myth of Adam; the cursed ancestor, or a distrust o(the natural world; so 
prone tq evil, or, at its most egregious, a turning away from existence, finding it 
"worthless as such, for not being divine, upon the arrival of God; the bad conscie11ce of 
man rejected the world in its entirety. 
• Thus enters the· master stroke of Christianity; in a world definitionally unfit by 
the existence of God, populated by sinners and the imperfect, saddled with more debt 
·than ever conceived.but.no 'way to discharge it, the Christian God takes it all upon 
· himself and sacrifices'liimself for his creations. "The creditor sacrifices himself for his 
debtor, out of love, out oflove for his debtor!" Then, at the will of the creator, can 
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man continue·to· live in the wodd, but,again at a price, to pay a debt which.can never 
be paid. 
Section 22 
· ."You will have ·guessed what has really happened here, 1/eneath all this: that will 
to self-tormenting, that repressed cruelty of the animal-man made inward and scared 
back into himself, the creature imprisoned in the· 'state' so as to be tamed, who 
invented the bad conscience in order to hurt himself after the more natural.vent for this 
desire had been blocked - this man of the bad conscience has seized upon the 
presupposition of religion so as to drive his self-torture to its most gruesome pitch of 
severity and rigor." · 
The creation of God, the conception of the divine, brings man to his most 
· ·crushing' shame and unrelenting guilt. Having already brought himself as low as he 
: . could on his own,.the arrival of perfection, in the form of an a11-loving .God, thrusts 
.into-man'.s viewthe "ultimate antithesis of his own ineluctable animal instincts.'' In 
· God, man finds a beirig completely lacking in all of the things which the bad 
conscience has taught man to hate. As well as shoving man's 'faults' into sharp relief, 
the existence of a creator who, in his _own perfection, is lacking all man's instincts yet 
loves hiin anyway, makes all -of man's instincts imperfection and, worse, a revolt against 
the perfection and the. divine by their very existence. Natural man, the conqueror 
and creator; falls one step further, from shameful to demonic . 
. In conjunction with this discovery, the same malicious artifice which earlier in 
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the ,history of:man twisted the narural, active discharge of man's will into a vice by 
. celebratirrg the weak; teactive'machinations of the herd, disguises· this horrible denial 
ofman's,self,.and sells it as the grandest of affirmations. Caging the animal in man, 
neutering his spirit, and· killing his-instincts is not denial of man, these people say, but 
affirmation of God and perfection. Thus, the destruction of man· is a positive ideal, as 
it is done for the .creator and all the divine that it represents. Man condemns himself, 
as an impure, shameful ·creation, to ·a lifetime of servitude and groveling,. and then 
praises himself for it. 
· But as horrible as this transformation and subsequent prostration may be, it is 
also notable for the sheer amount of will that it takes to happen, according to 
Nietzsche. The force of will .necessary for an.animal as strong as man to cage Himself, 
, for all eternity and with no hope of salvation until death, has been unequaled in the 
·. history ofthewo~ld. As completely and.drastically as the early "blonde beasts" strove 
to shape their world and ~ctate its future, the men of bad conscience "poison the 
fundamental ground of things," and created a world more akin to a cage than early 
man ever.thought possible. Yet he constructs this world and holds his warden :'IS his 
Savior. 
"What bestiali!J ef thought erupts as soon as he is prevented just a little from 
being a beast in deed ... Here is sickness, beyond any doubt, the most terrible sickness that 
has ever raged in man." 
,.. , .. 
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Section 23 
'.'.This should dispose once and for all of the questions of how the 'holy God' 
originated." 
The existence, even the worship, of gods in the world of men, in no way 
necessitates the-self-destruction and-.imprisonment·which the arrival of the Christian 
· God laid upon modern man. According to Nietzsche, the premiere example of the 
existence and'worship· of gods, to the benefit of human.life, is the Greek culture. The 
Greek-pantheon of gods existed 'as a celebration and confirmation of everything that 
made life-beautiful.· These·gods. were active, violent, aggressive entities who fought for 
what their. hearts· desired. Their worshipers molded the world in their image, 
unapologetic and unafraid,-and their gods inspired them to push themselves in life, 
not deny it;- "these Greeks used their gods precisely so as to ward off the bad 
conscience." 
· As evidence,:Nietzsche.cites the worqs of Zeus from Homer's, "Strange how these. 
· mortals so loudly complain ef the gods!-We alone produce evil, thq. SU:)'; yet themsewes make 
themselves wretched throughfally,, even counter to fate." "Folly" is what the Greeks, speaking 
through their highest of deities, found themselves suffering from; not guilt, not 
immorality, not impurity,.no/sin. The.difference is immense. The Greeks saw even 
.the most disappointing or painful outcomes as mere mistakes, unwanted results which 
one could lea!"Il from and :tise to their advantage when they act next. They did not 
shoulder guilt or debt from their gods or any divine morality, prostrating themselves 
and condemning themselves to. a life of servitude; instead they embraced a life of 
~--· 
• 
' . 
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action. · l\llost interesting, is the fact that the existence of.their gods seived as 
justification for the Greeks to live free of guilt, in direct opposition to the role of the 
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· ·. · Christian go.d. The Greeks, sure of their own worthiness, placed the blame for .evil or 
. irrationality on their gods.· When the worst among men would rear its head, the Greeks 
did not blame the. na~ure .. of man; they blamed the gods for direct/y causing such · 
atrocities which they were. sure .would·not come unbidden from as noble a creature as 
th:e conquering-man.: Their 'gods were their salvation, but because they shouldered·. 
the guilt in the preserit, not promised paradise in the future. The Greeks would 
accept the punishment for their 'folly,' and learn heartily froni it, but they would not 
carry·the guilt.for the rest of their lives. Such sentiments would .be entirely antithetical 
to the Greeks'. love for a life of action. "In this way the gods seived in those days to 
justify man to a certain extent even in his own wickedness, they seived as the 
,.originators.of evil -c in those. days they took upon themselves, not the punishment but, 
what is nob I.er, the guilt." 
Section 24 
. "What are you really doing, erecting an ideal or knocking one down?" 
But the creation of any ideal necessarily has a cost. To erect an ideal, 
something pure and.true, reality has to be tempered; or in Nietzsche's words 
"misunderstood ·and slandered .. " These lies must then become ·more important than 
reality. Man's conscience must be twisted, to accept this new "reality." Because the 
.creation of an ideal necessarily·demands an effect, particular to the ideal, on the 
,. ~ ~: 
' .... ',:•,-. ,·. 
. psyche of those in.its presence, the old ideals, sustained by their own worldview, are 
challenged. 
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, Modem man sits at the feet of millennia of shaping by bad conscience and · 
craven.ideals. This self-hatred is all ·modem man has known, all he has practiced, and 
-by.·now, he is a master of the dark art. By now the bad conscience has become so 
_ inseparably intertwined with man's natural inclinations that to disentangle modern 
man from this quandary seems impossible. 
Who among mo.dern man has "the strength to tum bad conscience against 'the 
unnatural inclinations which it was born from and has since sustained? Who can take 
. the mighty will that destroyed man; and become its salvation? All that this world 
.labels is good, comfortable, recoriciled, sentimental or weary. would stand against this 
man; nothing is more sure to exile a rrian from his fellow men, then to poke a hole in 
.. this fai,ade of respectability man has created. No, the comfortable "man" of this world 
· desire, only sameness and affirmation. Affirmation of.their lifestyles and beliefs, that is, 
not affirmation of their own vitality. 
The man such as this, that could .reverse this foul process, is extremely unlikely 
_ in this environment. This man must be a warrior, lusting for battle, conquest, danger 
and welcoming pain as affirmation oflife. It requires a strong man, unafraid of the 
demerits; to face them and beat them. And it requires a sort of "sublime wickedness, 
and ultimate, supremely self-confident mischievousness in knowledge that goes with 
great health." This "great health" is at the root. Whether this is possible today is 
- unsure, but in the'future this Redeemer may come. A man of"great love and 
·,· ..... · ,,. 
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.. contempt, the c~eati,ve spirit whose,compelling strength will not let him rest in any 
aloofness or any beyond, whose isolation is misunderstood by the·people as if it were 
flight from reality- while it is only his absorption, immersion; penetration. into reality, 
. so tliat, when he. one day emerges again into the light, he may bring home the 
· rei:iemption:ofthis reality." This·Redeemer will save us from both.nihilism and God. 
Section 25 
· "But what am I saying?.Enough!.Enough! At this point it behooves me only to 
be silent; for I shall usurp that to which only one younger, 'heavier with future,' in 
stronger than I has.a right - that to which only Zarathustra has a right, Zarathustra 
the goddess." 
. , ... Thus Nietzsche-ends the second essay on the Genealogy of Morals with a cry 
· .. to Zarathustra. Throughout his essay Nietzsche has gone to great lengths to show 
: · ho'w·the moralization ·and the supposed ennobling of man has crippled him and 
diverted him from his true path and his amazing potential. He has described the 
mental sickness of morality and Christianity, embedded deep within the psyche of 
modern man, and brought it to the light of day so all could see it for the cancer that it 
is. It is precisely the unnatural and dishonest ideals of a tamed man which has led 
modern man to the Great Depression of the soul in which he now finds himselflost. 
Only by .breaking away, by affirming one's existence as man, as such, and not as a· 
failed experiment, destined for.unworthiness, can inan once again find joy in life. 
What man could this be? Who will be this redeemer and how can modern inan 
i 
:, 
68 
recognize him? Nietzsche's answer is simple, Zarathustra. 
Zarathustra is alone. among men. He does not look to the outside for 
affirmation,, but within,· .He liyes .alone,, not needing the trappings of society or honor 
of others to feel fulfilled. He proclaims God's death happily, having no need for a 
· divine purpose, for what could be more divine than man at his highest? 
Conclusion 
It is obvious to those who would look past Nietzsche's colorful prose and 
vitriolic vocabulary, and who bother to read him generously and in his entirety, that 
Nietzsche is not a pessimist, or a nihilist. Quite to the contrary, Nietzsche is an 
optimist of the highest order and one with clear values which draw him far. closer to 
existentialism than nihilism. This is why he dedicates the first third of his essay 
proclaiming the great potential of man. 
This potential is exemplified most clearly, ·according to-Nietzsche, in the· 
instance ofa·proinise. A promise which is more than words; it is an expression of the 
. will of an individual 'to map the· world according to his desire, to force fate and nature 
into submission. Importantly, as Nietzsche mentions first and foremost, this is an 
ability uniquely human. The human animal has the power, more than any other 
creature on Earth; to create the world around them. This, according to Nietzsche, is 
the k9 to man's potential, if only he had the will to use it. 
And· this is,why Nietzsche writes so extensively on the conquering tribes of 
man's prehistory . .These men were men of will. They were brutal, violent, and 
., 
69 
merciless; joyously engaging in what the·modern man would proclaim barbarism, but 
they were 'happy. They were not burdened by the creation of morality or the 
oppressive gaze of a creator.; they were the creators. These meri,. which modern 
society and morality would deem primitive and base, were actually fulfilling their 
· potential as human beings far more than the most moral man today. This belief is 
what makes Nietzsche more than a nihilist. He is fighting for what he believes to be 
-the best course for humanity; he is striving to instill the values of old, which .raised his 
. ancestors to the highest ·peaks despite the harshness of a prehistoric world, into the 
people of today's society. And to understand the importance of this great return, one 
must understand the folly and hypocrisy of the current model, thus Nietzsche's 
preoccupation with the destruction of the J udeo-Christian morality which has infected 
the modern Western World. 
This is why Nietzsche rages so violently and loudly against the ennoblement 
and aggrandizement of the modern conceptions of justice and the punishment 
connected to it. Modern man :touts his sense of justice, his civic pride; and.his laws as 
the apex of civilization and the lighthous'e to guide man through the stormy waters of 
·the world. He proclaims it a higher conception than any before it; an evolved, 
sophisticated way ofliving, far beyond the knuckle-draggers of the past. But it is all 
· pretense; the violence is still there, the brutality is still there. It bathes the roots of 
justice and flows through-its-body, whether modern inan would care to acknowledge 
ifor not; for the key to all modern ideals lies hidden in the sanguine past of the most 
original, and most honest, of man's conception of interaction, the creditor-debtor 
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relationship. It is trus ,relationsliip, the materialistic notion of payment and debts 
·owed, ·which eventually m'orphed into what men call justice. It was not bani a noble 
.ideal, but a violent instinct. 
, , If.any doubt the bloocllust of modern man, or cannot see it hidden behind 
tradition and custom, one has only to look at the place of punishment in ·human 
society. The-modem wor-ld holds punishment as something.sacred. Punishment is 
reserved for·those actions which serve to instill the proper feelings of guilt and 
encourage the growth' ~fa moral center in those who have caused injury to the state 
or its citizens. It is specified violence. If the receiver were not found guilty of a crime, 
it would not be called punishment. If the act was not aimed at correcting the . 
. . .individual and merely a.t .causing·pain, then it would not be called punishment. But 
. , , ., all of these distinctions are folly; they. exist only to assure those who would enjoy such 
: acts can do so with a clean.conscience. l'uriishment is violence dressed up as pi~ty; as 
far as Nietiso::he is concerned, and that conclusion is easily reached upon examination 
of the birth and evolution of punishment in human society. 
Naturally, the proponents of modern society would argue that even given the 
underlying violence.found in the institution of justice and execution of punishment, 
the sum total of violence ii:t the world is less than it was without them. Trus is the 
crucial disagreemenrwhich Nietzsche has with them. According to Nietzsche, the 
violence has riot gone away, it has simply been internalized. This is the bad 
conscience. · In a world in-which discharging the natural violent instincts of man is 
· deemed immoral and illegal and holds dire consequences, the instincts do not die. 
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, They are merely .turned inwards upon the self. The. bad conscience, the disgust with 
humanity, its nature and its instincts, is self-mutilation; the invention of good and evil, 
. oppressive restrictions. Morality has not freed man from violence. Far from it, it has 
doomed man to be his -0wn. destruction., The world is still a violent and painful place, 
but man does it to himself and hides it behind the ideal, piety:· This is the root of 
Nietzsche's conflict with theJudeo-Christian God 
The advent of this God, in conjunction with the bad conscience, nearly 
doomed man: In the:face .of God, man found any further justification which he 
needed to.confirm his own worthlessness. TheJudeo-Christian God represented 
everything which man was not, and made man the animal unworthy. Everything 
· about itself which mankind had been rejecting was "confirmed" by the presence of 
the divine. Not even in debt to its own kind anymore, God became that thing to 
which man could· enslave himself. The appearance of supposed perfection brought 
,. man lower than he ever had been before, and left no apparent escape. 
At this moment, Nietzsche's lament is clear. Man has brought himselflow. 
Formerly the. conquering creators ofl:he world, man has shackled himself to false idols 
and behaviors contrary to his owri happy nature, and, in doing do; risk squandering 
the potential which took millennia of prehistory to create. The human soul, the bad 
conscience, which Nietzsche describes· as a great inward extension, a maw, is, in this 
sense, wuch like the Platonic cave. The bad conscience colors the world so that man 
q.nnot see the reality of his existence. The largest differeqce may be that in this case 
the people are not merely viewing shadows, they are shadows. · They are slaves to the 
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bad conscience and God, .not even.knowing what they truly are, what they could be. 
They see· only unworthy .creatures at the mercy and whim of the .creator. Nietzsche is 
trying to be the one to lead man out.of the cave, so that he can see the world, and 
himself, free of artificial constrictions. 
This.is the crux ofwhatNietzsche wanted to illuminate.in his essay, the stark 
differences .between the.happy conquerors of old and the dour subjects of today. 
Unfortunately, man has betrayed himself and chained himself under the illusion that 
modem society was more noble, more.fulfilling, more human. ·But .sadly, according to 
Nietzsche, none of it is true: • There is nothing noble about the false ideals of man. 
There is nothing more fulfilling in living a life denying one's instincts instead of' 
embracing .them. And there is certainly nothing human· about denying the very drives 
and urges which made humans what they were in the first place.· Human beings have 
the power to accomplish great things if only they would first overcome themsewes. For · 
Nietzsche, this means finding the strength to accept the true nature of the world and 
the true nature of human beings, and having the will to abandon the illusions which 
mankind has believed for so long; a return to innocence, a return to a world without 
evil, without good an.d without God. 
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